Solidarity (In)action? by Lemberg-Pedersen, Martin
Is the externalization of border control a viable 
way for the EU to ensure solidarity between its 
Member States, third countries and towards mi-
grants? Central EU discourses can be interpreted 
as an argument to this effect, yet a critical as-
sessment of the EU border system leads to ques-
tions about the internal consistency of this argu-
ment. 
Introduction
Th e 2000s witnessed an increase in EU externaliza-
tion, defi ned as Member States’ cooperation with third 
countries and non-state actors on migration control 
on third country territory (cf. Betts and Milner 2007). 
Since externalization has been pursued via diff erent ven-
ues, Christina Boswell (2003:613) distinguishes between 
preventive externalization addressing the root causes for 
refugees and the export of classical migration control to 
other countries. Others, like Th ierry Balzacq (2009:2-3), 
sees externalization as instances where one actor through 
international negotiations may gain »remote control« over 
the border control of other actors, which results in extra-
territorial migration control. As the visible manifestation 
of externalization, practices of extraterritorial control are 
hotly disputed, and has given rise to legal debates about 
whether European states honour their responsibility for 
human rights when they off shore border practices beyond 
their territorial boundaries (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). 
While most critical discussions of externalization have 
been from this legal perspective, this article adds to these 
a more normative focus capable of assessing the moral 
strengths and weaknesses of arguments concerning Eu-
ropean externalization.
A number of EU discourses found in policy docu-
ments deal with aspects of externalization and in the arti-
cle’s fi rst section, they are interpreted as the argument that 
externalization facilitates solidarity (the EFS-argument). 
It should be noted, though, that the EU is not a unitary 
actor freed from internal diff erences. Th e various EU-
forums diff er regarding their acceptance of supranational 
and intergovernmental competences regarding border 
control. Th us, while the EC and Frontex pursue suprana-
tional solutions to immigration, Justice and Home Aff airs 
(JHA) Councils are more prone to intergovernmental 
strategies retaining competences within the individual 
Member States (Lavenex and Wagner 2007). Th e arti-
cle’s interpretation of the various EU discourses as one 
normative argument is, then, not equivalent to the claim 
that the forums producing the discourses agree on all 
political counts. Rather, it is undertaken as an illustra-
tive way of bringing out those normative and empirical 
premises, which central EU institutions nonetheless do 
seem to share.
In its second section, the article argues that exter-
nalization is multifaceted and takes place through ven-
ues some of which are not normally considered border 
politics, such as privatised border functions and EC-do-
nations to humanitarian actors. Th ese examples are then 
used as empirical backdrops to problematise the EFS-
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argument’s empirical premise that externalization facili-
tates solidarity. Th e third section of the article analyses 
how Dublin-concepts like Safe Th ird Countries (STCs) 
and »fi rst country of arrival« aff ect the solidarity between 
European states, third countries and migrants adversely. 
Instead of facilitating solidarity, it is claimed, the political 
and economic pressure of powerful EU Member States 
creates a »ripple eff ect« in the border politics of entire 
regions, which I conceptualize as the systemic produc-
tion of border-induced displacement. Th is has grave hu-
manitarian consequences for migrants and those states 
unable to defl ect the fl ows of forced migration. Th e EFS-
argument’s empirical premise is therefore undermined, 
revealing an inconsistency between the argument’s nor-
mative goal of securing basic rights and the humanitarian 
consequences of externalization.
Th e argument that externalization facilitates 
solidarity
Th e EU’s ’Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: 
Global Freedom, Security and Justice’ off ers a justifi cation 
for externalization which is typical for EU discourses: in 
order to respond to the threats of terrorism, corruption 
and unmanaged migration fl ows, the ’development of the 
area of freedom, security and justice can only be success-
ful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third coun-
tries on these issues which includes strengthening the rule 
of law, and promoting the respect for human rights and 
international obligations.’ (Council of the European Un-
ion 2005). Th is discourse, then, justifi es externalization 
via a commitment both to liberal values such as basic, 
human rights as well as the EU’s value as an ‘area of free-
dom, security and justice’ (AFSJ).
A discourse grounded in these values and featuring 
prominently in EU policy documents on externalization, 
is that of solidarity. More specifi cally, EU externaliza-
tion and its border system are said to facilitate solidarity 
on three related levels: between EU Member States, be-
tween the EU and third countries and between the EU 
and refugees. Th us, the funding mechanism behind the 
Frontex Agency, the External Borders Fund, is presented 
as the »main solidarity mechanism« between Member 
States since it supports »the fair share of responsibilities 
concerning the fi nancial burden arising from the man-
agement of the Union’s external borders« (Commission 
Communication 2006:5). 
Similarly, the Commission asserts that externaliza-
tion facilitates solidarity between Member States and 
third countries when claiming that the »EU must share 
the responsibility for managing refugees with third coun-
tries and countries of fi rst asylum, which receive a far 
greater percentage of the world’s refugees than Europe. 
In this regard, more fi nancial support will be available to 
enhance protection capacity in third countries« (Com-
mission Communication 2008: 9). Th e transfer of funds 
to third countries is thus seen as the way to show solidar-
ity. Finally, the EU also claims that externalization facili-
tates humanitarian solidarity towards refugees since it is 
based on »fi rmness, solidarity and shared responsibility 
(…) to avoid the recurrence of tragedies at sea« (Brussels 
Presidency Conclusions 2009:11). 
Taken together, we can interpret the appeals to soli-
darity found in the above-mentioned policy documents as 
an argument to the eff ect that externalization facilitates 
solidarity (EFS):
1. Th e EU ought to secure basic rights for EU- and third 
country-citizens as well as migrants (cf. Council of the 
European Union 2005).
2. Securing basic rights, requires a solidary border sys-
tem that protects both communities and migrants (cf. 
Commission Communication 2008).
3. EU externalization manages migration in a way that 
facilitates solidarity between Member States, between 
the EU and third countries and towards migrants (cf. 
Brussels Presidency Conclusions 2009).
4. Th erefore: All things being equal, the EU ought to im-
plement externalization to secure the basic rights for 
EU- and third country-citizens as well as migrants.
Th e EFS-argument starts with a normative premise 
that basic rights are to be promoted for all, be it EU-, 
third country-citizens or migrants. A second normative 
premise says that this requires a border system based on 
solidarity and a third, empirical, premise states that EU 
externalization fulfi ls this function by facilitating solidar-
ity between the EU’s Member States, third countries and 
migrants. Th is then yields the normative conclusion that 
the EU ought to implement externalization. 
Th e second premise of the EFS-argument can be 
interpreted as a particularist view akin to what David 
Miller calls »liberalism-on-communitarian-foundations« 
(Miller 1995:193). Th e premise highlights the need to 
protect citizens which connects to the view that com-
munities are of intrinsic moral value and that the unilat-
eral ability to exclude migrants through border control 
is therefore legitimate. However, just like the EU-dis-
courses, Miller’s view diff ers from pure communitarian-
ism because he also grants normative importance to basic 
rights (Miller 1995:73). Together, then, the communi-
tarian and liberal components make for a view where 
moral responsibility is seen as falling in two dimensions 
determined by memberships. Th e fi rst is derived from 
everyone’s membership in the global human community 
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whereas the second concerns people’s national or, in the 
case of Schengen-citizens, supranational, memberships. 
According to Miller;
in considering relationships to outsiders, we 
should not fall into the trap of thinking that 
our only relationship to them is of one human 
being to another. We are certainly related in 
that way; but, in considering my ethical 
relationship to, say, a Tanzanian, I should not 
forget that we are also related as Briton to 
Tanzanian. Each of us is linked internally to 
our own national community, and this creates 
a second dimension to our relationship 
alongside the fi rst, which complicates the 
ethical picture (Miller 1995:73).
On this particularist view humanitarian and national re-
sponsibilities are juxtaposed and European states have a 
special responsibility for the rights of their own citizens, 
a responsibility, which can outweigh that towards third 
countries and migrants (Miller 1995:73). European states 
are rarely responsible for accepting migrants because the 
universal obligation to aid »falls in the fi rst place on the 
national and smaller communities to which the needy 
rights-bearer belongs« since these are responsible for the 
production of forced migration in the fi rst place (Miller 
1995:75-6). Similar to the EU-discourses, Miller says 
that the European obligation to show solidarity, in most 
cases can be discharged by transferring funds to, or ex-
ercising political pressure on, those countries producing 
refugees or experiencing transit migration.
A lot of weight in the EFS-argument is carried by 
the third, empirical, premise that externalization facili-
tates solidarity between European states, third countries 
and migrants. As mentioned, though, externalization is 
pursued through a number of diff erent venues and the 
premise therefore needs further specifi cation. In prin-
ciple, these other venues need not pose problems for 
the EFS-argument as long as they facilitate solidarity. 
However, if the empirical premise is found to represent 
a fl awed account of externalization, the EFS-argument’s 
normative conclusion becomes problematic. If the em-
pirical premise does not correspond to the actualities of 
externalization, this can create an inconsistency between 
the normative goal of securing basic rights and the actual 
consequences of EU externalization. To assess whether 
this is the case the relation between the EFS-argument’s 
empirical premise and its normative conclusion must be 
examined. Th is is the topic of the following section.
Externalizing through private and humanitarian 
venues
Th e political goal of externalizing migration control can 
be pursued through actors and venues falling outside 
border politics as they are traditionally understood. Two 
such venues are the outsourcing of border functions to 
private actors and the ear-marking of European UN-
HCR-donations.
When it comes to the privatisation of EU border con-
trol, the fi rst clear-cut case came with the 1990 Schengen 
Convention’s carrier sanctions. Th ese obliged transport 
companies, under threat of substantial fi nes, to conduct 
pre-arrival screening of travellers for visas, passports and 
other travel-documents. Private companies were thus ef-
fectively transformed into actors in the European border 
control. Yet, while border control may be an obstruction 
to economic interests of transport and travel companies, 
it has also become a profi table market for other compa-
nies. Th us, the 2000s has witnessed an unprecedented 
introduction of Private Security Companies (PSCs) into 
European border functions. 
Th e multinational security conglomerate G4S has, 
for instance, been contracted by the UK Border Agency 
(UKBA) to operate British detention camps, like Brook 
House, Dungavel, Oakington and Tinsley House, man-
age all transports of asylum seekers between these as 
well as running all deportations out of Great Britain (a 
contract which, however, was not renewed following the 
death of an Angolan national during a deportation in late 
2010). Th e EU-subsidised EUROSUR border project, to 
be completed in 2013, illustrate a diff erent kind of private 
involvement in EU border control. EUROSUR is prem-
ised on the European desire to create »full situational 
awareness« for European states through a so-called »com-
mon pre-frontier intelligence picture« of the migration 
movements in third countries close to Europe. To this 
end a plethora of primarily European security and weap-
ons companies are developing a wide range of projects 
on surveillance and control of irregular migrants. Most 
of these projects are being subsidised via EU fi nancial 
instruments. 
Th e Italian defense giant Finmeccanica’s contracts for 
border control, is yet another example of PSC-involve-
ment in European border control, in particular with the 
political context of externalization. In 2008 a Friend-
ship Pact was made between Italy and Libya where Italy 
agreed to pay 255 million dollars annually over twenty 
years as a gesture of solidarity and apology for the colo-
nial occupation in the previous century (Gazzini 2009). 
Some of these funds were earmarked to private Italian 
investments in the Libyan control-infrastructure. Th us, 
Libya, Italy and Finmeccanica formed the joint venture 
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Libyan Italian Advanced Technology Company (LI-
ATEC) providing technology and equipment to Libya’s 
security infrastructure. Finmeccanica-subsidiaries simul-
taneously landed contracts for the sale of helicopters, air-
crafts and drones to Libya. Finally, in 2009, Libya gave 
the Finmeccanica-subsidiary SELEX SI a €300 million 
contract for a C3 (Command, Conquer and Communi-
cation) border infrastructure along Libya’s entire north-
ern coastline. Th e rebels fi ghting Gaddafi  have already 
promised to honour this contract.
As the cases of G4S, EUROSUR and Finmeccanica 
show, privatised border control comes in diff erent forms. 
Some concern the transfer of control functions like camps 
and deportations from public to private hands, while oth-
ers concern the development of border-infrastructures at 
Europe’s territorial edges or in third countries. Grant-
ing themselves the role as security experts, PSCs portray 
their products as the most expedient and cost-eff ective 
alternative for politicians and civil servants facing the 
»threats« and »risks« of migration. Proponents of priva-
tised border control can thus depict PSC-involvement in 
European border control as a better way of reaching the 
EFS-argument’s normative goal of securing basic rights 
through solidarity.
However, PSC-involvement in border control does 
not only herald a shift in actors, but also a shift in the 
very function of the borders. Finmeccanica’s sales of 
drones to Libya illustrate that the technologies deployed 
thoroughly transform the European border-regions, and 
thus also the internal politics of third countries. Despite 
Human Rights Watch’s characterization of the Libyan 
camps as corrupt and ranging from negligent to brutal 
(Human Rights Watch 2009: 74), the privatised drive to 
boost the Libyan control-power has continued unabated. 
Critics of privatised border control can argue that 
since the border functions on sale have the goal of com-
batting illegal migrants, the underlying technologies are 
premised on the administrative criminalization and ex-
clusion of irregular migrants. PSCs compete fi ercely to of-
fer such »solutions« by developing technologies for moni-
toring irregular migrants before they enter European 
territory. One case in point is the EUROSUR seaBILLA-
project, which involves PSCs like Eurocopter, EADS 
and Finmecanicca-subsidiary Aleania Aeronautica, and 
is designed to »fi ght illegal immigration«, which is to 
say boatmigration in the Atlantic and South Mediterra-
nean Seas, through UAVs and networks of passive sensors 
(Commission Staff  Working Paper 2011). However, the 
1951 Refugee Convention explicitly says that states »shall 
not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a terri-
tory where their life or freedom was threatened (…) enter 
or are present in their territory without authorization« 
(UNHCR web-page). Pointing to the Refugee Conven-
tion, critics can therefore say that the current privatisa-
tion drive seems to create an entire border infrastructure 
premised on functions, which are counterproductive to 
the EFS-argument’s goal of securing basic rights through 
solidarity towards third countries and migrants.
When it comes to externalization through humani-
tarian venues, proponents of the EFS-argument argue 
that humanitarian donations is a legitimate way to dis-
charge European states’ obligation for solidarity with 
third countries and migrants. However, as the case of 
donations to the United Nations High Commisioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) illustrates, humanitarian donations 
in themselves do not guarantee solidarity. 
As a state-based structure the UNHCR depends 
upon the political will of its members to donate funds 
and in 1994, 95 percent of its donations came from the 
EC and fourteen governments of industrialized countries 
(Hyndman 2000:57). Observing the funding fl ows to the 
UNHCR in the 1990s and 2000s a clear trend stands out: 
UNHCR-projects aiming to off er migrants the opportu-
nity to live in European states do not attract anywhere 
near as much funding as projects designed to contain 
migrants in their regions of origin. A critique against 
the EFS-argument’s is thus that while agencies like the 
UNHCR can be used to show solidarity, their structural 
dynamics also makes them vulnerable to attempts from 
powerful donors to utilise the agency for their own politi-
cal agendas (Hyndman 2000; Bakewell 2008).  
Th us, the EC earmarks all of its project-donations 
and given that it is the second-largest donor (after the US) 
in the world, this grants the union a powerful infl uence 
on the overall UNHCR-capacity. Th e vast majority of 
EC-funds are directed towards projects of extraterritorial 
migration control like repatriation, resettlement, »assisted 
returns«, »voluntary repatriations« or refugee camps. 
Such UNHCR-projects therefore play an important in-
direct role in the EU’s creation of s̀pace and distance´ 
to migrants. Critics of the EFS-argument can argue that 
the EU’s donations to UNHCR are used primarily to 
contain migrants in their regions of origin, which, in 
turn cautions us against accepting the EFS-argument’s 
assumption that the transfer of funds can straightfor-
wardly discharge EU’s obligation to exhibit solidarity 
with third countries and migrants.
Th e overall EU system of migration control can, in 
the words of Matthew Gibney be described as producing 
»engineered regionalism« (Gibney 2007:63-4), that is, 
conditioning migrants to remain in their regions of ori-
gin. A case in point is the ten thousand hunger-infl icted 
Somalis arriving at the UNHCR-funded Dadaab camp 
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in Kenya every week during the summer of 2011. By 
choosing to increase funds to the Dadaab camp instead 
of, say, temporarily housing Somali refugees, European 
states eff ectively contain the migrants in their region 
of origin. Originally built for 90.000 people, Dadaab 
currently hosts a population of almost 440,000 people, 
much more than the annual amount of asylum seekers 
to all EU Member States combined. Th e notion that EU 
countries are discharging their obligation to exhibit soli-
darity by donating funds to Dadaab bypasses that such 
»engineered regionalism« makes the world’s poorest and 
most unstable countries bear the brunt of humanitarian 
obligations towards refugees (Gibney 2007:64). Th e way 
in which European states utilize UNHCR-projects and 
set the premises for PSC-involvement according to their 
own political agendas therefore problematises the EFS-
argument’s empirical premise.
At this point proponents of the EFS-argument might 
acknowledge the asymmetrical utilization of these ven-
ues for European agendas, but argue that this is still in 
accordance with the argument’s liberal-communitarian 
requirements since it permits that Schengen-citizens are 
prioritized over communal aliens. Th e requirement of 
securing basic rights for migrants, they can say, is still 
discharged since European states actively promote the 
Dublin Regulation’s solidary foundations, such as »safe 
third countries« and »fi rst countries of arrival«. Th rough 
these foundations, this line of thought goes, European 
states can impose some measure of stability for migrants 
and third countries instead of allowing regions to suc-
cumb to the chaos of unmanaged migratory movement. 
Th is justifi cation of the EFS-argument is assessed in the 
article’s fi nal section.
Externalization and border-induced displacement
At the outset the claim that the EU border system is 
based on foundations of solidarity faces diffi  culties as re-
cent years have witnessed an ever-increasing number of 
disagreements between EU Member States.
One source of great debacle has been the Dublin 
Regulation’s notion of »country of fi rst arrival« which 
ascribes responsibility for processing asylum claims to 
the European country migrants reach fi rst. Due to their 
geographic location at the EU’s external borders, this ef-
fectively force Southern Member States like Greece and 
Italy to process the brunt of asylum claims. Th us, while 
Denmark in 2008 made 1725 asylum decisions, Italy and 
Greece made, respectively, 20.260 and 30.915 decisions 
(Eurostat 2009). It is those states that fail to control the 
external borders of the EU, which end up with responsi-
bility for asylum claims (Gil-Bazo 2005:574).
Moreover, even if migrants succeed in transiting a 
Southern Member State country and arrive at a North-
ern Member State, the Dublin Regulation ensures that 
the latter can deport them back without assessing their 
asylum claims. Th e tensions between Italy and France fol-
lowing the refugee fl ows from Tunisia and Libya in early 
2011 showed, Northern Member States are reluctant to 
aid Southern Member States. To this, the Italian minister 
Roberto Maroni commented that; »Europe prides itself 
on grand principles, but when called on to demonstrate 
its solidarity, nothing happens.« (AGI 09.04.2011). As 
a matter of fact, then, the claim that the EU’s border 
system facilitates intra-European solidarity does not bear 
up to the facts. Instead, the system seems to be based on 
the self-interest of European states, and, in particular, of 
Northern Member States to avoid migrants. As the camp 
conditions in Greece and Italy illustrate, this has serious 
humanitarian consequences for migrants. 
Th e lacking solidarity is also illustrated by another 
disagreement between EU Member States, namely the 
issue of responsibility for responding to boatmigrants’ 
distress calls. In May 2011, survivors from a boat car-
rying 72 migrants away from the Libyan turmoil, told 
of how NATO helicopters and ships as well as the Ital-
ian coastguard repeatedly ignored their distress calls 
eff ectively abandoning them to the Mediterranean for 
16 days (Guardian 8.May 2011). Being forced to drink 
seawater and their own urine, the survivors woke to new 
deaths every morning. When the boat washed back up 
on the Libyan shore, 61 of the 72 refugees, many women 
and children, had died. Th is tragic case is not unique as 
thousands of people have drowned in the Mediterranean 
following the North African spring.
Proponents of the EFS-argument may at this point ar-
gue that even if the EU Member States’ do not show soli-
darity towards each other, the external dimension of the 
border system is nonetheless imposing some measure of 
stability for migrants and third countries. Th us, they can 
say, European Neighbourhood Policy-negotiations be-
tween the EU and third countries like Morocco, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Libya have proven to be highly ef-
fective ways of consolidating readmission agreements be-
tween the EU and third countries. Th is has paved the way 
for Member States to determine »safe third countries« 
(STCs) to which irregular migrants can be deported in a 
responsible manner. While deportations may appear not 
to exhibit solidarity towards migrants, the claim is that 
the STC-list ensures that they end up in safe countries.
Yet, the claim that deportations to STCs impose 
safety and stability in regions of migration can be chal-
lenged. For one thing, the EU’s STC-list has been criti-
cised severely for including repressive police states, like 
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Morocco, with records of beatings and exploitation in 
their detention facilities (Gadem 2010; Human Rights 
Watch 2002). Furthermore, it has been argued that EU 
countries use the notion of STC as a mechanism to defl ect 
their obligations to assess asylum claims to other coun-
tries (Costello 2005:49; Gil-Bazo 2006:596). Moreover, 
the »safe« countries receiving deportees most often do not 
allow them to stay. Seeking to avoid being turned into 
dumping zones for deportees, these countries arrange 
their own readmission agreements with other countries 
to which the already-deported migrants are deported 
again, creating the phenomenon of »chain deportations« 
(Byrne&Shacknove 1996: 185; Costello 2005:45).
Another case in point is the Ceuta and Melilla-inci-
dents. In these Spanish Enclaves at the Moroccan bor-
ders, hundreds of irregular migrants attempted to climb 
the border-fences in order to reach European territory. 
Tragically, Spanish and Moroccan security forces fi red 
live rounds at the migrants resulting in the deaths of 
over 100 from shots or falls (Goldschmidt 2006:1-2). 
Over the following weeks, the EU put the Moroccan 
authorities under considerable pressure to avoid similar 
scandals and they reacted by deporting thousands of ir-
regular migrants either to the Saharan desert without 
food, water or medicine (Doctors Without Borders 2006: 
42) or to countries like Algeria and Mauritania. From 
there the migrants were deported onwards to yet other 
countries and in the end many ended up in the countries 
they had escaped to begin with. Similarly, between 2003 
and 2006, Libya deported 198,000 persons to countries 
like Egypt, Sudan, Mali, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Fortress 
Europe 2007:6).
Th e lacking solidarity in the EU border system illus-
trates a crucial point about its overall function: political 
pressure from powerful European states creates a »ripple 
eff ect« in the border politics of both Southern European 
and North African states. Th e result is the creation of 
a decentralized system of enforced displacement whose 
function cannot be reduced to a `Fortress Europe .́ Th is is 
because the system does not simply accumulate migrants 
at the EU »walls«, but instead, as the cases of chain de-
portations show, continuously produces fl ows of forced 
migration, transferred between states. Externalization in 
particular relies upon the establishment of transportation 
channels between extraterritorial control-elements rather 
than singular control-points. Put diff erently, the Ceuta 
and Melilla-fences, Moroccan deportations, Libyan and 
Algerian camps or Frontex operations in the waters of 
Senegal, Mauritania and Cap Verde all serve to defl ect, 
manage and steer migrants within the externalized border 
space. Th e system depends upon the ability of individual 
states to traffi  c migrants between each other as they at-
tempt to defl ect responsibility for them, in eff ect consign-
ing migrants to a state of quasi-permanent displacement.
Th is problematises an assumption shared by most dis-
cussions of European border control, namely that it is a 
response to already-existing forced migration. Alexander 
Betts (2009: 5) defi nes forced migration as »movement 
that takes place under signifi cant structural constraints 
that result from an existential threat«. As Betts (2009:11) 
rightly points out, understanding the causes of forced mi-
gration requires looking at global political trends and the 
concept of forced migration is a useful way of highlight-
ing that people often fl ee for reasons which transcend the 
Refugee Convention’s narrow interpretation of refugee-
hood as persons individually persecuted for reasons of 
nationality, race, religion, or membership in ethnic and 
political communities. Hence, besides refugees, the cat-
egory of forced migration also includes migration caused 
by confl ict-induced displacement, development-induced 
displacement and environmental-induced displacement 
(Betts 2009:4-10). Since these kinds of displacement can 
jeopardize basic rights, there are also strong moral reasons 
for using the category of forced migration. On this view, 
then, European states may be causing forced migration 
through, say, fi shing policies, debt-policies or military 
interventions, and the border control they impose is then 
only a response to the forced migration resulting from 
such policies (Betts 2009:13-4). 
Yet, although the engineered regionalism enforced 
through EU externalization is also very much a global 
political trend, the above categorization of forced migra-
tion means that it is conceptualized as a phenomenon 
external to the enforcement of border control. Th is, how-
ever, bypasses the fact that the EU’s decentralized border 
network is a socio-geographical space that produces en-
forced mobility in itself. Th e categorization thus removes 
from the causes of forced migration the way states’ defl ect 
and transfer migrants between each other. Th e EU bor-
der system should therefore also be seen as a cause of a 
forced migration in itself and to capture this, I shall call 
the forced migration caused by the EU border system for 
border-induced displacement (see also Lemberg-Pedersen 
forthcoming).
Th e diff erence between the original forms of displace-
ment and border-induced displacement is one between 
fi rst order and second order categories. Th us, civil wars, 
occupations, the disintegration of livelihoods or natural 
disasters do lead to displacement, but when the people 
forced to migrate for these reasons are intercepted, de-
tained and chain deported within the EU-conditioned 
border network, they experience another kind of dis-
placement. Border-induced displacement, then, is not 
equivalent to the original displacement of people, but 
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functions instead as a displacement imposed upon al-
ready-displaced people.
Th e phenomenon of border-induced displacement 
generates two severe problems for the EFS-argument. 
Firstly, although the argument’s particularism deems 
it legitimate for the EU to prioritize Schengen-citizens 
over communal aliens, the view’s liberal component 
still requires the protection of migrants’ basic rights. 
However, the continuous production of border-induced 
displacement in the EU border system undermines the 
claim that externalization imposes safety and stability 
for migrants. While the system may appear stable it is 
so only for certain European countries, and only at the 
expense of migrants, third countries and the Southern 
European Member States. Secondly, a key assumption 
in the EFS-argument’s second normative premise, its 
two-dimensional account of moral responsibility, is that 
the border control itself is not causing forced migration. 
Yet, since the responsibility for causing forced migration 
cannot be isolated to refugees’ countries of origin, but 
also resides with the EU qua its externalization, further 
reponsibility for receiving asylum seekers is generated ac-
cording to the union’s own normative premise (see also 
Lemberg-Pedersen 2011).
A critical inquiry shows that the empirical premise 
of the EFS-argument represents a fl awed account of ex-
ternalization. Th e EU border system does not facilitate 
solidarity, but seems instead based upon the wish of 
Northern European states to defl ect their responsibility 
for migrants. Th is has created a decentralized system that 
trades upon the continuous production of border-induced 
displacement and space and distance between Northern 
European countries and migrants. Th is problematizes the 
two normative premises in the EFS-argument: externali-
zation seems to undermine both the liberal requirement 
to secure migrants’ basic rights as well as the assumption 
that responsibility for forced migration can be deter-
mined according to a two-dimensional account of moral 
responsibility. At the end of the day, a critical assessment 
of the EFS-argument’s premises reveals a grave inconsist-
ency between the normative goals espoused by the EU 
and the actual consequences of externalization.
Conclusion
To conclude, this article interpreted central EU dis-
courses on externalization as the EFS-argument with its 
dual normative commitment to basic rights and the value 
of communities. Its particularism was seen as based on 
the assumption that the EU can legitimately prioritize its 
moral responsibilities according to people’s status as com-
munal members or aliens. States from which migrants 
fl ee were seen as having the biggest responsibility for 
their plight, while externalization through the transfer 
of funds or political pressure in most cases were seen as 
a legitimate way for European states to discharge their 
obligation to exhibit solidarity towards basic rights.
It was then pointed out that the legitimacy of the 
EFS-argument’s normative conclusion depended on the 
accuracy of its empirical premise that externalization 
in fact does facilitate solidarity. Yet, it was argued, Eu-
ropean states’ utilization of UNHCR-projects through 
EC earmarking and PSC-contracts accorded more to the 
political agendas of Europe than that of third countries 
or migrants. Th e empirical premise did not take into ac-
count, fi rstly, how European funds are used to assign the 
brunt of responsibility for refugees on the world’s poor-
est states and, secondly, how PSC-contracts under the 
EUROSUR-umbrella or those between Finmeccanica 
and Libya are premised on border politics seemingly at 
odds with the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Following this, the claim that the EU border sys-
tem despite its faults nevertheless imposes some meas-
ure of stability for third countries through the Dublin 
Regulation was assessed. However, since repressive police 
states are included in the safe list and these also conduct 
chain-deportations it was argued that the STC-concept 
defl ects rather than facilitates EU solidarity towards third 
countries and migrants. Th e disagreements between Eu-
ropean states concerning both Dublin’s »fi rst country of 
arrival«-concept and responsibility for answering boat-
migrants’ distress calls further exacerbated this critique 
and highlighted the humanitarian consequences of the 
lacking solidarity.
Turning the claim of intra-European and third coun-
try solidarity on its head, the article therefore argued that 
the European border system should be seen as a decen-
tralized system of enforced displacement caused by the 
political and economic pressure from powerful European 
states. As these attempt to defl ect their responsibility to-
wards migrants through externalization »ripple eff ects« 
are created aff ecting the border politics of countries inter-
acting with the EU. As such, the decentralized border sys-
tem was seen as trading upon the continuous production 
of what I termed border-induced displacement, in order 
to create space and distance between Northern European 
countries and migrants. Th e article therefore concluded 
that a critical assessment of the EFS-argument’s premises 
reveals a grave inconsistency between the normative goal, 
claimed to be at the heart of EU externalization and the 
actual consequences of its multifaceted practices.
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